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Abstract 
This paper interrogates the equation of women and peace through the prism of the 
Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). The Program was designed 
to create the conditions for inclusion of the insurgency within the democratic system 
and provide a roadmap for peace. It builds on a central justification of the war: the 
liberation of Afghan women. It requires gender mainstreaming in accordance with 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and subsequent 
Resolutions, to include women in all stages of the process. The APRP underscores 
tensions between international and local standards that claim to ensure women’s 
interests are protected in peacebuilding. The effort to impose gender mainstreaming 
is emblematic: yielding partial gains for women who have internalized international 
perspectives on their rights, but excluding those who have not. 
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Resumen 
Este documento interroga la ecuación de la mujer y la paz a través del prisma del 
Programa de Paz y Reintegración de Afganistán (APRP). El Programa fue diseñado 
para crear las condiciones para la inclusión de la insurgencia dentro del sistema 
democrático y proporcionar una hoja de ruta para la paz. Se basa en una justificación 
central de la guerra: la liberación de las mujeres afganas. Ello requiere la 
incorporación de la perspectiva de género de conformidad con la resolución 1325 del 
Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y las Resoluciones posteriores, para 
incluir a las mujeres en todas las etapas del proceso. La APRP subraya las tensiones 
entre los estándares internacionales y locales que pretenden asegurar que los intereses 
de las mujeres estén protegidos en la consolidación de la paz. El esfuerzo para 
imponer la incorporación de la perspectiva de género es emblemático: se obtienen 
beneficios parciales para las mujeres que han interiorizado las perspectivas 
internacionales sobre sus derechos, pero excluyendo a quienes no lo han hecho. 
Palabras clave: Afghanistan, APRP, paz, exclusión, marginación, mujer 
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I suffer not the work of any worker, male or female, to be lost 
(The Family of Imran, The Qur’an). 
 
he Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) was 
launched in 2010 to create the conditions for coexistence and 
dialogue with the Taliban. The Program builds on a central 
justification for the war: the liberation of Afghan women (Abu-Lughod, 
2002).  
Gender mainstreaming is a principal tenet of the process, stemming from 
ideas codified within United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and 
subsequent Resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, and 2122). These are 
targeted not only at the disproportionate impact of war on women, but also at 
the pivotal role women should and do play in conflict resolution and the 
realization of durable peace. The APRP underscores inevitable tensions 
between international and local standards that claim to ensure women’s 
interests are protected in peacebuilding. The effort to impose gender 
mainstreaming is emblematic of this. 
I argue that this effort has yielded partial gains for women who have 
internalized international perspectives on their rights, but excluded those who 
have not. Moreover, even those women who have benefited suffer from the 
paradox of being both seen and unseen. As standard bearers of what is often 
perceived as cultural imperialism, they are vulnerable to violent counterattack 
in the context of ongoing war.  
The Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda underpinning gender 
mainstreaming assumes symmetry in the positions of men and women: but 
fails to address the complex ways in which gender is perceived by power 
relations within particular societies. Considering men and women as though 
they confront similar obstacles reifies disparities between them. Formal 
numerical inclusion in the APRP, as in other political processes, has not and 
cannot ensure changed practices.  
I want to interrogate what counts as participation. For women in rural 
communities, productive participation leads to a range of practical 
manifestations of agency in family and community life. It is a priority for 
women to realize peace and security, but different cultural requirements are 
needed for this. Participation has to be inclusive of difference. 
T 
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The discourse of the War on Terror concerning the “liberation of Afghan 
women” (Abu-Lughod, 2002) continues to contaminate the peace process and 
international attempts to ensure women’s participation. There is a sharp focus 
on the gender apartheid of the Taliban, accompanied by neglect of more subtle 
forms of marginalization. While women’s and human rights groups involved 
in the APRP have largely internalized Western narratives on gender equality, 
a range of alternative views exist. These groups cannot speak for all Afghan 
women. Marginalization or exclusion of women from post-conflict decision-
making processes means that the specific issues surrounding women's 
vulnerability may not be adequately addressed, or even at all.  
The Taliban were neither the architects of women’s oppression in 
Afghanistan nor the only current source of their disempowerment. Feminist 
scholarship pays inadequate attention to the role of warlords in contemporary 
Afghan democracy and their ties with some women at the forefront of the 
peace process (Wordsworth, 2007, p. 3). These connections are overlaid by 
differences in ethnicity, tribe and class. Within the neat friend/enemy 
dichotomy, conflict-induced differences between women are overlooked.  
Both the Afghan government and Taliban interlocutors to the peace 
process understand the value of the term ‘gender’ as a tool for legitimization 
and mechanism for external funding, which the APRP is entirely dependent 
upon (Quie, 2012). This at least ties the Program to rhetoric on gender 
mainstreaming. In reality, however, key protagonists are resistant to the very 
word ‘gender.’  
Afghans say that stories are the data of the soul. One that aptly captures 
the tensions surrounding the use of ‘gender’ in the APRP concerns a male 
colleague responsible for outreach to local women in Kandahar. A man 
fulfilled this role because of the intensity of conflict in the province. Women 
could not obtain security approval for the job. I asked him about his 
interactions with women and views on gender mainstreaming. He replied:  
Gender is not a word I use in Kandahar. It is still confusing for us. People in 
local villages think it is a ‘foreign invention.’ They don’t know what it means 
and neither do I. Instead, I translate it into our own language (Interview with 
Abdul Baser Miyakhil, 2010).  
This anecdote highlights key problems I set out in this paper. Universal 
notions of freedom and participation encoded in the WPS agenda are not 
easily translatable in the Afghan context. The attempt to do this instead results 
in a loss of culturally relevant nuances surrounding local understandings of 
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these ideas. Potentially, this generates what, in the context of natural disasters, 
Harvey (2016) has termed as “secondary violences.” 
 What happens when women’s participation is mandated without a 
correlative effort to understand its complexities in an Afghan context? Why is 
there such a wide gap between the rhetoric and the realities of participation? 
Is all participation recognized, or do pre-conceived notions exclude those who 
fall outside these understandings? What is the significance of these 
exclusions? How does the dichotomization of gender and its link with peace 
and security undermine the potential for peace?   
Although the media and international community depict the conflict 
through the bounded image of a friend/enemy distinction, it is far more 
complex. The former Gender Advisor to the APRP, Quhramaana Kakar, 
noted:  
Now threats are everywhere. There is no clear enemy. At times, Taliban 
representatives to the peace process are more open to recognizing women than 
corrupt government officials. Even close family members can pose a threat to 
women’s participation in conflict resolution and more fundamentally, to their 
safety (Interview, 2014).   
Baryali Helali, a communications advisor to the peace process, said, “the 
peace program calls the Taliban ‘brothers,’ but we don’t see them as an enemy 
to be destroyed (Interview, 2011).  
The Taliban have never articulated a comprehensive political vision. On 
paper, they demand an Islamic Emirate based on a strict interpretation of 
Sharia – but this eschews gender equality as understood within the WPS 
framework. Further challenges are entailed by the tensions between 
Afghanistan’s formal endorsement of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent 
Resolutions on the one hand and the primacy of Islamic law on the other.  
Article 7 of the Constitution affirms that “Afghanistan shall observe the 
UN Charter, inter-state agreements and international treaties it has joined.” 
Yet Article 3 states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions 
of the sacred religion of Islam.” This is reinforced by Article 130, which 
affirms that Hanafi law takes precedence when no provisions in the 
Constitution or other laws relate to specific cases (Afghanistan Online).  
The tension between recognition of international human rights norms and 
Islam creates broad latitude for interpretation. A senior Taliban representative 
to the APRP, Mullah Hotak, acknowledged that the treatment of women under 
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their regime had been “costly,” and that they should be afforded “equal but 
different” recognition (Interview, 2010).  
The notion of ‘difference’ is at odds with the WPS agenda; yet this term 
was prevalent among diverse actors in the peace process. The Deputy Minister 
to the APRP, Aziz Ahmadzai, cautioned against “one size fits all” attempts to 
empower women and involve them in conflict resolution: “Without cultural 
sensitivity and appreciation of difference, women will suffer more” 
(Interview, 2010). Women in conservative rural areas targeted by the APRP 
further highlighted the problem of ‘difference’: placing more emphasis upon 
influence within their families and communities than on individual rights.  
The stress on ‘difference’ indicates that the WPS agenda does not seem to 
‘translate’ well across differing cultural contexts. The prime focus of this 
research is therefore to explore the impact of gender mainstreaming on the 
Afghan peace process. This is critical in identifying obstacles to the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions, and 
understanding how women’s participation may be recognized and enhanced. 
It is a priority for women to realize peace and security; but different cultural 
requirements are required for this to be achieved. 
UNSCR 1325 (2000) calls on member states to ensure the equal 
participation and full involvement of women in all efforts in peace and 
security promotion; and urges actors to incorporate a gender perspective. 
Subsequent Resolutions call for the further strengthening of women’s 
participation in peace processes and the development of indicators to measure 
progress. Yet the Afghan peace process raises critical questions about what 
counts as participation, how it is manifested and ways in which it might be 
nurtured and developed.  
Sixteen years after UNSCR 1325 was unanimously adopted, the 
conspicuous absence of women from peace negotiations underscores a 
disturbing gap between rhetoric and reality. A review of the APRP reveals 
that women have had little impact on the design or implementation of the 
process. In cases where women have been included, this has largely been an 
exercise of form over substance. Numerical inclusion cannot be equated with 
the notion of participation specified by the WPS agenda.  
Within the family-centered and close knit rural communities of 
Afghanistan, women are conceptualized as the bearers of the family honour 
(haqq). Gender codes place the duty of protection on men. Women prove 
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themselves worthy of protection through adherence to strict moral norms, 
capacity for reproduction and roles as cares within the family. Transgression 
of gender codes routinely results in violence, including honor killings 
(Amnesty International, 2015). 
Gender mainstreaming as practiced by the APRP brackets out 
masculinities; but this failure to address gender in a holistic way undermines 
the potential for attitudinal change. There are multiple forms of masculinity 
within Afghan communities, expressing both hierarchy and exclusion. 
Moreover, there is clearly a ‘hegemonic’ form of masculinity that ties in with 
patriarchy.  
That said, men involved in the APRP often demonstrated a degree of 
ambivalence around masculinities. A Ministry official observed, “It is a 
problem that we don’t allow our women to be educated. They are our servants 
but we are their servants” (Interview, 2010). The word ‘gender’ and the WPS 
agenda itself have come to be associated almost entirely with women. Yet men 
and boys are the gatekeepers of gender equality.  
According to the sociologist, Raewyn Connell, “men predominate across 
the spectrum of violence” (Breines, Connell, & Eide, 2000). She believes a 
strategy for peace must concern itself with this fact, the reasons for it, and its 
implications for violence. Masculinity is located within a structure of gender 
relations. Schwalbe (1992) argues that patriarchy – that is to say, the structure 
of gendered power - limits men’s capacities to take the position of the ‘other’ 
and engage in an ethic of care.  
This argument is highly relevant to the question of peace. Yet masculinity 
is not merely a static ‘place’ in a map of gender relations. Rather, it is an active 
social construction, a pattern of social conduct, which responds to the 
situations in which individuals find themselves.  
The rhetoric of the War on Terror co-opted Western feminists: who viewed 
the intervention as a means of rescuing oppressed Afghan women. The 
pervasive epigram of the burqa depicts these women as shrouded by religion 
and patriarchy. Western media portrayals continue to recycle these images, 
obscuring cultural meanings and possibilities for agency. The positing of 
women’s agency as co-substantial to relations of domination and the 
concomitant normalization of freedom/autonomy as an ideal is woven into the 
WPS agenda. 
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Theorists such as Abu-Lughod (2002) offer a different reading. She refers 
to Papenak’s description of the burqa as “portable seclusion.” This presents 
adherence to cultural tradition (specifically, the veil) as signifying “belonging 
to a particular community and participating in a moral way of life in which 
families are paramount in the organization of communities and the home is 
associated with the sanctity of women” (Abu-Lughod, 2001). 
Through their metamorphosis as subjects with duties and obligations into 
individuals with rights and freedoms, women participating in the APRP are 
not merely “free to choose” but obliged to be free, “to understand and enact 
their lives in terms of choice” (Rose, 1999, p. 87). Yet not only is this at 
variance with traditional conceptions of freedom within Afghan society; it is 
incompatible with what those women who have internalized Western 
discourses of rights want from the peace process. Within the critical 
reintegration phase of the APRP, these women opted for community-based 
recovery, repudiating ideas of individual rights and freedoms. 
 
Methodology 
 
This research aims to provide a context-based, qualitative analysis of the 
APRP through participatory observation and analysis of secondary sources. It 
derives from my role as a Consultant to the APRP between 2010 and 2016, 
focusing on the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Labor. My remit involved 
consultation with Afghan women, human rights groups, and other 
representatives of civil society. I also participated in consultations with the 
Taliban, alongside JS and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
staff. As part of the implementation phase, I structured specialized 
development programs for former insurgents and ideas for de-radicalization 
centers.  
Given the above, there is a risk of bias; but this is outweighed by access to 
highly sensitive sources: including reports on the emerging reintegration and 
reconciliation strategy, semi-structured interviews with Afghan and 
international stakeholders, primary documents connected with the APRP, 
media reports, recorded and unofficial conversations held in Kabul between 
April and November 2010, and correspondence or Skype interviews with 
Afghan leaders, carried out between November 2010 and July 2016.  
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Translators were used for interviews in Pashtu. This implies multiple 
possibilities for distortion; but every effort was made to verify the research 
presented. A context of extreme violence shaped the kinds of questions asked 
and information provided, mostly owing to the potential for the security of 
those interviewed to be compromised. 
 
Gendered Dichotomies 
 
Binary distinctions solidify the definition of women during the application 
of gender mainstreaming in the APRP. The central dichotomy of the WPS 
agenda is that of opposition between men and women in terms of war and 
peace. Harris and King (1989) argue that this distinction between aggressive, 
war-making men and nurturing, peaceful women is deeply problematic. Such 
myths tend to reinforce militarism, devalue women and de-legitimize multiple 
forms of agency deployed in the quest for peace.  
The association between fighting and masculinity is clearly evident in the 
APRP. In June 2010, President Hamid Karzai convened The National 
Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ), in order to confer the Program with the seal 
of democratic legitimacy.  From the outset, female representatives to the 
NCPJ expressed their sense of exclusion, referring to their “unique experience 
of war and deprivation and their emergence as survivors” (APRP, 2010). 
Women’s representatives drafted detailed proposals for applying United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 
1960, 2106 and 2122; the 2004 Constitution (Afghanistan Online); and 
elements of the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (UN Partnership for 
Peace), to include women in all stages of the process. They asked that a 
National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2015) be integrated as a core element of future national security 
policy. They sought a concrete process to encourage religious leaders to speak 
out on women’s rights in Islam. They called for the APRP to promote access 
to education, health, justice, and other basic services; and improve awareness 
of women’s rights through effective implementation (Nemat, 2011, pp. 32-9).  
They also called for greater civic education, in order to raise awareness of 
women’s rights at community level and improve support for female leadership 
in the peace process. They wanted independent monitoring of all government 
actions, particularly the peace process, as international forces withdrew. A 
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majority supported gender mainstreaming throughout the APRP. Finally, they 
demanded a transparent system of monitoring/evaluation and a voice in the 
APRP Trust Fund, to ensure that financial incentives for reintegration were 
used to support women’s empowerment and development and the protection 
of their rights (Interviews with members of the Afghanistan Independent 
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the Afghan Women’s Network, 
2010-2014).  
International donors to the Program insisted on recorded consultations with 
women and human rights groups - yet the ministry charged with design and 
implementation, the Joint Secretariat (JS), intentionally avoided this. The 
recommendations drawn up by women were not disseminated. Instead, both 
international and Afghan actors prioritized rapid implementation over a 
consultative design strategy. An international consultant noted, “Time is a 
luxury we don’t have” (JS Meeting, June 2010).  
Consequently, international actors only monitored the number of meetings 
that the JS held with women, rather than their qualitative impact. In 
correspondence, donors referred to the need for “cultural sensitivity” 
(Meetings with JS donors, June 2010). An international actor verbally advised 
of the need for “avoiding confrontation and any trace of cultural imperialism” 
(Ibid). JS officials, meanwhile, were savvy in their understanding of gender 
mainstreaming. They fulfilled the ‘formal’ requirement for women to 
participate in the process – but did not allow them a genuine voice.  
This small snapshot illustrates the double marginalization which women 
activists experienced. Already excluded from the post-2001 political compact, 
they now found themselves marginalized by a charade of participation. The 
hidden rationale of JS officials is that “women don’t participate in war and 
therefore have no real role in the pursuit of peace” (Interviews with JS 
officials, 2010–12), which echoes fundamental elements of international 
positions too. 
The friend/enemy dichotomy has also resulted in further divisions which 
undermine the recognition of women’s participation. In designing the process, 
ISAF pressed for ‘de-radicalization’: emphasizing the need for civic education 
to reintegrate former combatants. This was consistent with their understanding 
of the Taliban as an ‘enemy.’  
Women’s and civil rights representatives concurred, believing it to be 
critical in transforming the consciousness of former fighters and their 
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communities, in order to cultivate a form of peace that reflected these rights 
(Interviews with female NCPJ representatives, 2010).  Orzala Ashraf Nemat, 
a women’s rights activist, asked, “What is the point of asking reintegrating 
combatants to accept the Constitution when they don’t know what’s in it?” 
(Interview, 2014) Nemat’s question highlights the attention paid to rhetoric 
over practice. 
Three ministries, including the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, 
were tasked with developing civic and vocational education. Yet leading JS 
officials rejected de-radicalization and were indifferent to civic education. 
They explained this was a response to what they considered an attack on 
“Afghan ownership.” In reality, it may have owed to regular threats of 
violence from the Taliban. 
The question of de-radicalization was particularly sensitive because it 
touched upon ‘moderate’ interpretations of Islam: which women and civil 
rights groups demanded as a vital component of the process. Senior JS 
officials argued that anything related to religion was off-limits for foreign 
actors, employing the rationale of “cultural sensitivity.”   
The eventual compromise was a much-diluted version of civic education, 
devised by ministries that demonstrated little enthusiasm for the APRP. 
Consequently, some ex-combatants undergo a weak type of de-radicalization, 
but most do not. This increases risks of recidivism and draws upon an 
exclusionary vision of peace and ownership. Conservative government actors 
were able to shrewdly exploit the idea of cultural imperialism. In the absence 
of a shared set of cultural meanings that facilitate intelligibility, women’s 
voices were silenced. 
Unlike South Africa, there are no Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
in the Afghan peace process. Female representatives to the NCPJ asked for 
accountability for gender-based violence and other violations of women’s 
rights and an end to impunity, particularly for sexual violence in war. They 
insisted on women’s participation in transitional justice processes and the 
management of reparations. This demand continues to receive the backing of 
the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.  
However, both the government and international actors focused merely on 
direct violence in war. ‘Justice’ is ostensibly achieved through what the ISAF 
Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC) refers to as “organic reconciliation” 
(Interview with Ileana Baca, 2011) within communities. This has been highly 
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cost effective for international donors; but amounts to a capitulation to 
conservative Afghan factions, further constricting the space for genuine 
coexistence.  
Fears that women’s rights are being traded in exchange for reintegration 
and reconciliation with the Taliban were further underscored by the National 
Unity Government’s recent pivot on the Constitution. President Ghani 
contends that a workable peace settlement will have to include a new Afghan 
Constitution, or institutional arrangements that allow the Taliban to become a 
legitimate part of the government (Haress, 2014).  
This would provide for a loya jirga, in which representatives of the 
Taliban, the Afghan government, and civil society come together to amend 
the current Constitution or write an entirely new one. The price of peace for 
women who embrace the WPS agenda may therefore cost even more than war.  
The pattern of form over substance is repeated in the representative 
dimension of the APRP. Both JS officials and Taliban interlocutors highlight 
what they perceive as the international community’s “hypocrisy” in 
demanding 27% female representation in Parliament and a significant position 
in the peace process by referring to the relatively low number of women in 
American and European political arenas. Some went further: warning of a 
“counterattack” on Afghan women involved.  
Minister Stanekzai argued that measures to implement UNSCR 1325 under 
conditions of ongoing war and foreign occupation could be interpreted by 
Afghans as yet another form of colonial intervention. He referred to a “clash 
of civilizations” and the ways in which gender becomes a kind of “structuring 
principle” in contemporary debates between Western powers and Muslim 
countries. Against this background, opposition to mainstreaming women is 
tantamount to a reassertion of Afghan sovereignty (Interview, 2010). 
The use of representation as a ruse for gender mainstreaming is also 
apparent within the showpiece leadership forum of the APRP. The HPC 
purportedly leads the peace and negotiation process. In reality, it does not play 
a central role in the effort to pursue negotiations with the Taliban. Under both 
President Ghani and his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, negotiations have largely 
taken place in secret.  
Although nine of its 70 members are female, they cannot be said to provide 
a genuine voice for women.  Female members of the Council whom I 
interviewed often spoke of being treated as “empty tokens” (Interviews, 2015-
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6). As in the Afghan Parliament, the presence of officials with known records 
of human rights abuses, war crimes and continuing links to illegal armed 
groups leads to a culture of fear and intimidation. This divides female 
members and renders them vulnerable to factional politics, ultimately 
silencing them.   
Wordsworth (2007) maintains that contrary to the “romanticized portrayals 
in Western media,” Afghan female politicians are divided “across ethno-
linguistic, class, political and regional lines.” Employing the concept of 
“multiple identities,” she explains that women may have common interests, 
but other ties may be more significant. Women, like men, are also vulnerable 
to corruption.  
In 2016, the Minister for Women’s Affairs, Delbar Nazari, narrowly 
survived a vote of no confidence in Parliament. She was accused of corruption 
and professional ineffectiveness. The motion against Nazari illustrated the 
longstanding conflict between different female politicians for influence over 
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. War has fostered a culture of manipulation. 
The “patronage-based, zero-sum nature of Afghan politics contributes to a 
system where one person’s gain is another’s loss” (Ibid).  
Moreover, secrecy and concealment are inherent in the operations of the 
APRP and silence women’s voices. Although gender mainstreaming was 
mandated and a Gender Advisor appointed in 2010, the incorporation of 
women and recognition of their demands has been inconsistent. In July 2011, 
for example, 30 women from Hizb-i-Islami families approached Najira 
Zeweiri, a female representative on the HPC. Zeweiri put them in touch with 
the Gender Advisor, Kakar.  
The women came to the JS at great risk, travelling from areas of intense 
conflict. Their message was clear: they were tired of war and the costs 
imposed on their families. They wanted their men to talk to the government: 
“We may not fight but we can influence our men.” Yet they complained of 
“finding no space” for their voices within the process. They could not work 
and their children, particularly their daughters, could not pursue education. 
They wanted a genuine impact on the peace process and to set up a systematic 
program of talks (Interview, 2014). 
Both the Head of the HPC, former President Rabanni (assassinated in 
2011), and the Council were informed, but took no action. For them, 
participation in the conflict and its resolution was synonymous with combat 
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and the decision to lay down arms. Kakar remarked that President Rabbani 
did not recognize the Hizb-i-Islami women’s perceived influence within the 
family as action conducive to peace.  
Interestingly, these women were themselves largely conservative and 
unlikely to have internalized Western (‘foreign’) narratives of women’s rights. 
Recognition of their initiative may have legitimized calls by Afghan women’s 
groups and international actors for a substantive role in the APRP. In an effort 
to placate Taliban participants (often rivals within the insurgency to Hizb-i-
Islami), however, the women’s initiatives were sidelined. Their campaign was 
simply unacknowledged. This framing dichotomizes men as agents and 
women as passive pawns. Women were marginalized because they did not 
conform to constructed gender images (Elshatain, 1987, p. 4) of viable 
participation.  
The same pattern can be observed in the trajectory of the NAPWA, a 
fundamental demand of female representatives to the NCPJ in 2010. More 
than five years later, it was finally launched by President Ghani – but appears 
to be yet another token designed in order to facilitate exclusion. No plan for 
implementation exists, no concrete set of responsibilities has been assigned to 
APRP institutions, and no timeline or budget has been proposed.  
International donors are demanding remedies to these problems, and Ghani 
has assured women of full inclusion; but he will not “bother them until the 
right time” (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Women’s activists interpret this as 
meaning that their participation is “an optional token” (Interviews with 
Wazima Frogh, 2015), rather than a critical component. Indeed, a 2014 report 
found that in 23 rounds of peace talks between the Afghan government and 
insurgency between 2005 and 2014, women were present on only two 
occasions (Oxfam, 2014). 
The final phase of the APRP is perhaps most significant for the realization 
of women’s participation, and is called “National Community Recovery.” 
This is where reintegration of former combatants is achieved; but it disturbs 
fragile power balances. Women from Taliban families who may have suffered 
stigmatization often find themselves further punished. As the most powerless 
group within rural communities, they represent optimal targets.  
Female fighters are virtually nonexistent in the Taliban. According to the 
JS, the number of female re-integree beneficiaries is so low, it could not be 
recorded. In deriving the equation between fighting and ‘participation,’ the 
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APRP does not recognize the indirect support women provided to the 
insurgency (Interview, 2010). Instead, women are conceptualized as 
inseparable from the family unit. This is highly problematic: although women 
do not carry weapons, they play critical roles in providing moral and logistical 
support to fighters. Reintegration/reconciliation is simply assumed through 
communities’ acceptance of ex-combatants; but women enjoy no entitlements 
linked to their individual rights.  
Their views are actually substantially at odds with the perspectives of 
international and Afghan government actors, but this is ignored. Gender 
mainstreaming only applies to women who champion “universal” principles 
of peace and security. This has serious implications for transnational feminist 
praxis, efforts to construct counter-hegemonic projects and transform 
dominant structures of power that give rise to war. It points to a real, pressing 
need to incorporate difference. 
 
Discussion 
 
Efforts to mainstream UNSCR 1325 into the APRP raise fundamental 
questions about how policy concepts are translated into practice. Evaluation 
of successful practice touches on interpretations of the meanings of equality, 
freedom and active agency. Much of the effort to ‘translate’ the WPS agenda 
is founded on un-nuanced dichotomies. A language of rights cannot fully 
capture the complications of lives actually lived. A vision of freedom as 
autonomy/freedom to choose is linked to participation: silencing action that 
falls outside these boundaries.  
As Charlesworth and Chinkin (2002) note, the trouble with: “All types of 
gendered discourse is that it makes some courses of action impossible to 
contemplate… gendered discourses and thinking in dichotomies confines our 
perspective to simple either-or propositions.” 
Moreover, women’s empowerment is perceived as a threat to Afghan 
culture and traditional values. Stanekzai advised that this framing could 
exacerbate violence: “Attitudinal change is critical.” To remedy this, he 
suggested bringing concepts of male and female rights into public spaces 
through locally valued community practices (Interview, 2014). 
Gendered discourse of ‘rescue,’ integral to legitimization of the War on 
Terror, also seeps into the APRP. The difficulty lies in the destination this 
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implies. Postcolonial scholars emphasize that the idea of ‘rescue’ tends to be 
based on an equality norm modeled on Western liberalism (Abu-Lughod, 
2002). In Foucauldian terms, liberal equality norms are naturalized within the 
WPS agenda. Alternative forms of freedom rooted within webs of legitimacy 
outside the borders of individual agency are overlooked or even excluded 
altogether. 
The dichotomy of men as warriors and women as peacemakers obscures 
the extent to which women participants are affected by class-based, ethnic and 
tribal differences, all of which impact on capacities for agency. Afghanistan 
is a multi-ethnic society, where ethnic ties seem in most cases to trump 
gender-based solidarity.  
Stanekzai drew attention to the paradox of “wanting to overcome 
invisibility while risking the dangers of being seen” (Interview, 2012). 
Wazima Frogh, co-founder of the Women Peace and Security Research 
Institute, reaffirmed the issue of risk: “We used to engage with lots of 
reintegrated Taliban but then many of the women were warned, some were 
attacked and injured and therefore we stopped.” She has received multiple 
threats of violence because of her involvement in the APRP: “Telephone and 
face-to-face threats. People came to my house warning my father to stop his 
daughter from defaming and dishonoring him” (Interview, 2015). 
The recent occupation of Kunduz substantiated the fear of violent 
consequences. In a systematic campaign, the Taliban ruthlessly pursued 
women in public roles, particularly activists for peace and democracy. 
Messages were left with their neighbors saying: “Return and you will be dead” 
(Interview, 2015).  
This has been particularly terrifying for women because of Kunduz’ 
violent past, including at least two cases of stoning (Nordland, 2010). It has 
taken years for women to feel secure enough to embrace public roles; now, 
they are targeted again. Omnipresent fear means that few will feel able to 
defend their positions in the peace process as it moves forward. 
Important Afghan power asymmetries have also been concealed. The 
National Unity Government contains powerful warlords: including Abdul 
Rashid Dostum, the Vice-President. A number of women in positions of 
power have close ties with warlords. Ramazan Bashardost, a former candidate 
for the presidency, notes that much of the HPC “has more experience of war 
than of peace;” and that it is difficult to promote the WPS agenda through 
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open debate when significant actors have access to substantial militias and do 
not hesitate to abuse their power (Interview, 2016).  
Similarly, Azarabaijani-Moghaddadam (2007) contends that “women and 
the institutions set to protect and further their rights know that they are fair 
game if they cross the line and challenge conservative elements – knowledge 
that keeps them in a state of paralysis.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
The lacunae between the rhetoric and realities of women’s participation 
illuminate clear failures of the WPS strategy in recognizing multiple identities 
and subtle expressions of agency. Sustainable peace is an intersubjective 
phenomenon. The APRP has an inadequate focus on how peace is shaped by 
discourses and practices. It mistakenly assumes that its overall purpose is so 
apparent that examination or a genuinely broad dialog is not required. Lack of 
clear mechanisms for or recognition of dialog, as in the neglect of the Hizb-i-
Islami women’s initiative, militates against a new consensus. 
A central way in which feminism and crisis thinking may intertwine is 
when feminist ideas are co-opted to legitimize crisis interventions. 
International actors in the APRP, particularly women, believed they were 
working to improve the situation of all Afghan women. They were unaware 
or unconcerned about the suppression of those who did not share their vision 
of peace. 
International actors, meanwhile, certainly did not anticipate that their 
participation in the APRP would bolster conservative positions on Sharia law 
and undermine the quest for women’s rights, but their goal of a rapid exit 
stifled other aims. They employed the ruse of “cultural sensitivity” to conceal 
their interests. Clearly, feminist ideas serve diverse, often unintended 
purposes.  
The goal of the APRP is to create the conditions for an inclusive peace by 
enfranchising the Taliban and other marginalized groups. Gender 
mainstreaming is intended to promote and enhance women’s participation in 
all aspects of conflict prevention, management and resolution. However, a 
uni-dimensional understanding of gender that brackets out those women who 
have not internalized international norms fails to build the capacities of all 
GÉNEROS –Multidisciplinary Journal of Gender Studies, 6(1) 1204 
 
 
women to engage in the peace process. This dichotomization of the universal 
and the local has proven highly counterproductive.  
Heyzer warns that “we must guard against regarding gender equality and 
women’s empowerment as a set of technical tools and concepts de-linked 
from practices, power and politics” (2005, p. 11). Overcoming dualities 
implies wider empowerment. If empowered communities are the site of 
transformative agency, the most expansive possible understanding of gender 
must be deployed. Ethics of care stand in sharp contrast to the artificiality of 
the application of universal standards.  
Gilligan regards this uniform application as “morally problematic, since it 
breeds moral blindness of indifference” (2008, p. 471). Through the lens of 
the ethics of care, individuals have varying degrees of dependence and 
interdependence on one another. This differs from deontological and 
consequentialist perspectives, which tend to view them as having independent 
interests and interactions.  
The gender dualism of the WPS agenda places men and women in 
contradiction with each other. The Taliban portray themselves as the 
protectors of Afghan culture and the purity of its women. This delineates an 
opposition: identifying with the West means rejecting Afghan heritage; while 
rejecting the West means clinging to tradition and accepting subordination. 
As Weeda Mehran, a women’s rights activist, put it, “the solution is to pursue 
peace in ways that overcome the divide” (Interview, 2015). 
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